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Abstract    The concept of 'information' in five different realms – technological, 
physical, biological, social and philosophical – is briefly examined. The 'gaps' be-
tween these conceptions are discussed, and unifying frameworks of diverse nature, 
including those of Shannon/Wiener, Landauer, Stonier, Bates and Floridi, are ex-
amined. The value of attempting to bridge the gaps, while avoiding shallow analo-
gies, is explained. With information physics gaining general acceptance, and biol-
ogy gaining the status of an information science, it seems rational to look for links, 
relationships, analogies and even helpful metaphors between them and the li-
brary/information sciences. Prospects for doing so, involving concepts of com-
plexity and emergence, are suggested. 
It is hardly to be expected that a single concept of information would sat-




Information is information, not matter or energy. 
(Norbert Wiener) 
 
Shannon and Wiener and I 
Have found it confusing to try 
To measure sagacity 
And channel capacity 
By ∑ pi log p. 
(Anonymous, Behavioural Science, 1962, 7(July issue), p. 395) 
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Life, language, human beings, society, culture – all owe their existence to 




'Information' is a notoriously slippery and multifaceted concept. Not 
only has the word had many different meanings over the years – its 
entry in the full Oxford English Dictionary of 2010, which shows its 
usage over time, runs to nearly 10,000 words – but it is used with 
different connotations in various domains. For overviews of the mu-
tability and diversity of the information concept, see Belkin (1978), 
Machlup and Mansfield (1983), Qvortrup (1993), Bawden (2001), 
Capurro and Hjørland (2003), Gleick (2011), Ma (2012), and 
Bawden and Robinson (2012). 
 
In this chapter, we will focus on usage in different domains and dis-
ciplines. As Capurro and Hjørland (2003, p. 356 and 396) say: "al-
most every scientific discipline uses the concept of information 
within its own context and with regard to specific phenomena …, 
There are many concepts of information, and they are embedded in 
more or less explicit theoretical structures". Our concern will be to 
examine these different concepts of information, and in particular 
the 'gaps' between them. By 'gap', we mean the discontinuities in un-
derstanding which make it difficult to understand whether the 'in-
formation' being spoken of in different contexts is in any way 'the 
same thing', or at least 'the same sort of thing'; and if not, in what 
way – if any – the different meanings of information relate to one 
another. Given the current enthusiasm for 'information physics', ex-
emplified by writings of Zurek, Vedral, Lloyd and others cited in 
2.2, we place particular stress on the information concept in the 
physical sciences. We have also tried to emphasise the historical 
perspective of these ideas. 
 
We will focus particularly on the implications of these considera-
tions for the idea of information in the field of library/information 
3 
science. Perhaps because information is at its centre, there has been 
particular debate about the issue in this discipline; see Belkin and 
Robertson (1976) for an early account and Cornelius (2002), Bates 
(2005) and the reviews cited above, for overviews of the on-going 
debate. A Delphi study carried out by Zins (2007) presents many 
definitions of information for information science, typically relating 
information to data and/or knowledge.  
 
Indeed, it is the relationship between these concepts that is a con-
stant concern, perhaps even an obsession, within the information 
sciences. This has led to two main classes of model (Bawden and 
Robinson 2012, Ma 2012). The first, based in Karl Popper's 'objec-
tive epistemology' uses 'knowledge' to denote Popper's 'World 2', the 
subjective knowledge within an individual person's mind. 'Infor-
mation' is used to denote communicable knowledge, recorded, or di-
rectly exchanged between people; this is Popper's 'World 3' of objec-
tive knowledge, necessarily encoded in a 'World '1 document, or 
physical communication. Information, in this model, is 'knowledge 
in transit'. The second regards information and knowledge as the 
same kind of entity, with knowledge viewed as 'refined' information, 
set into some form of larger structure. This is typically presented as 
a linear progression, or a pyramid, from 'data', or  'capta' – data in 
which we are interested – through 'information' to 'knowledge', per-
haps with 'wisdom' or 'action' at the far end of the spectrum or the 
apex of the pyramid; see, for example, Checkland and Holwell 
(1998), Frické (2009), Rowley (2011), and Ma (2012). 
 
The debate on the nature of information within the information sci-
ences, somewhat limited in scope, has been widened by some wider 
visions, such as those of Buckland and of Bates, which will be dis-
cussed below. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to widen per-
spectives still further; to attempt, in effect, to begin to answer John 
Wheeler's question 'What makes meaning?', by considering concep-
tions of meaning-free and meaningful information, and the relations 
between them.  
  
We begin with a brief consideration of the way in which information 
is viewed in several diverse domains. 
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2 Information in various domains 
We will examine the concept of information in five domains, in each 
of which information has come to be regarded, at least by some, as a 
central concept: technological, physical, biological, social and philo-
sophical. For reasons of space, the discussion must be cursory, and 
the reader is referred for more extensive treatments (at an accessible 
level in the case of the scientific perspective) to Gleick (2011), 
Greene (2011), Deutsch (2011), Floridi (2010A), Davies and 
Gregersen (2010), Vedral (2010, 2012), Lloyd (2006, 2010), von 
Baeyer (2004), Smolin (2000) and Leff and Rex (1990, 2002).  
 
2.1 Information and communication technology 
We begin with technology rather than the sciences, since the closest 
approach yet available to a universal formal account of information 
is 'information theory', originated by Claude Shannon, and properly 
referred to as the Shannon-Weaver-Hartley theory in recognition of 
those who added to it and gave it its current form. Gleick (2011) 
gives a detailed account of these developments, which all occurred 
in Bell Laboratories, and which focused on communication network 
engineering issues. 
  
The initial steps were taken by Harry Nyquist (1924), who showed 
how to estimate the amount of information that could be transmitted 
in a channel of given bandwidth – in his case, the telegraph. His ide-
as were developed by Ralph Hartley (1928), who established a quan-
titative measure of information, so as to compare the transmission 
capacities of different systems. Hartley (1928, 535) emphasised that 
this measure was "based on physical as contrasted with psychologi-
cal considerations". The meaning of the messages was not to be con-
sidered; information was regarded as being communicated success-
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fully when the receiver could distinguish between sets of symbols 
sent by the originator. His measure of information, understood in 
this way, was the logarithm of the number of possible symbol se-
quences. For a single selection, the associated information, H, is the 
logarithm of the number of symbols 
  
H = log s 
 
This in turn was generalised in 1948 by Claude Shannon into a fuller 
theory of communication, which was later republished in book form 
(Shannon and Weaver 1949). This volume included a contribution 
by Warren Weaver that  expounded the ideas in a non-mathematical 
and more wide-ranging manner. Weaver’s presentation arguably had 
greater influence in promoting information theory than any of its 
originators' writings. 
  
Following Nyquist and Hartley, Shannon defined the fundamental 
problem of communication as the accurate reproduction at one point 
of a message selected from another point. Meaning was to be ig-
nored: as Weaver noted, "these semantic aspects of communication 
are irrelevant to the engineering problem" (Shannon and Weaver 
1949, 3). The message in each case is one selected from the set of 
possible messages, and the system must cope with any selection. If 
the number of possible messages is finite, then the information asso-
ciated with any message is a function of the number of possible 
messages. 
 
Shannon derived his well-known formula for H, the measure of in-
formation 
 
H = - K ∑  pi log pi 
 
where pi  is the probability of each symbol, and K is a constant de-
fining the units. The minus sign is included to make the quantity of 
information, H, positive; this is necessary as a probability will be a 




Shannon pointed out that formulae of the general form H = - ∑  pi 
log pi  appear very often in information theory as measures of infor-
mation, choice, and uncertainty; the three concepts seem almost 
synonymous for his purposes. Shannon then gave the name 'entropy' 
to his quantity H, since the form of its equation was that of entropy 
as defined in thermodynamics. It is usually said that the idea of us-
ing this name was suggested to him by John von Neumann. The 
original source for this story seems to be Myron Tribus who, citing a 
private discussion between himself and Shannon in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, on March 30th 1961, gives the following account:  
 
When Shannon discovered this function he was faced with the need to name it, for it 
occurred quite often in the theory of communication he was developing. He considered 
naming it 'information' but felt that this word had unfortunate popular interpretations that 
would interfere with his intended uses of it in his new theory. He was inclined towards 
naming it 'uncertainty', and discussed the matter with John Von Neumann. Von Neumann 
suggested that the function ought to be called 'entropy' since it was already in use in some 
treatises on statistical thermodynamics. Von Neumann, Shannon reports, suggested that 
there were two good reasons for calling the function 'entropy'. 'It is already in use under 
that name', he is reported to have said, 'and besides, it will give you a great edge in 
debates because nobody really knows what entropy is anyway'. Shannon called his 
function 'entropy' and used it as a measure of 'uncertainty', interchanging between the two 
words in his writings without discrimination.  (Tribus 1964, p 354) 
 
Whatever the truth of this, Shannon's equating of information to en-
tropy was controversial from the first. Specialists in thermodynam-
ics, in particular, suggested that 'uncertainty', 'spread', or 'dispersion' 
were better terms, without the implications of 'entropy' (see, for ex-
ample, Denbigh 1981). A particularly caustic view is expressed by 
Müller  (2007, 124, 126): " No doubt Shannon and von Neumann 
thought that this was funny joke, but it is not – it merely exposes 
Shannon and von Neumann as intellectual snobs…. If von Neumann 
had a problem with entropy, he had no right to compound that prob-
lem for others … by suggesting that entropy has anything to do with 
information … [Entropy] is nothing by itself. It has to be seen and 
discussed in conjunction with temperature and heat, and energy and 
work. And, if there is to be an extrapolation of entropy to a foreign 
field, it must be accompanied by the appropriate extrapolations of 
temperature and heat and work". This reminds us that, when we see 
later that there have been criticisms of the use of objective measures 
of information in the library/information sciences, these have been 
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matched by criticisms regarding the arguably uncritical use of in-
formation concepts in the sciences. 
  
Shannon's was not the only attempt to derive a mathematical theory 
of information, based on ideas of probability and uncertainty. The 
British statistician R.A. Fisher derived such a measure, as did the 
American mathematician Norbert Wiener, the originator of cyber-
netics. The latter seems to have been irritated that the credit for the 
development was given mainly to Shannon; less than ten years later, 
he was referring to "the Shannon-Wiener definition of quantity of in-
formation" and insisting that "it belongs to the two of us equally" 
(Wiener 1956, 63) His mathematical formalism was the same as 
Shannon's but, significantly, he treated information as the negative 
of physical entropy, associating it with structure and order, the op-
posite of Shannon's equating of information with entropy and disor-
der:   
 
"The notion of the amount of information attaches itself very naturally to a classical 
notion in statistical mechanics: that of entropy. Just as the amount of information in a 
system is a measure of its degree of organization, so the entropy of a system is a measure 
of its degree of disorganization; and the one is simply the negative of the other" (Wiener 
1948, 18). 
 
Shannon's information is, in effect, the opposite of Wiener's, which 
has caused confusion ever since for those who seek to understand 
the meaning of the mathematics, as Qvortrup (1993) makes plain.  
 
In Shannon's sense, information, like physical entropy, is associated 
with lack of order. A set of index cards, ordered alphabetically, has 
low entropy, and little information; if we know the order of the al-
phabet, we know all there is to know about the ordering of the cards, 
and we can explain it to someone very briefly. If they are disordered, 
however, they contain, in Shannon's sense, much more information, 
since we would need a much more lengthy statement to describe 
their arrangement. 
 
By contrast, there is a long-standing idea that information should be 
associated with order and pattern, rather than its opposite; in es-
sence, this view follows Wiener’s conception. Even Warren Weaver,  
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arguing in support of Shannon, wrote that  "the concept of infor-
mation developed in this theory at first seems disappointing and bi-
zarre – disappointing because it has nothing to do with meaning, and 
bizarre  …. in these statistical terms the two words information and 
uncertainty find themselves to be partners" (Shannon and Weaver 
1949, 116). Leon Brillouin, who pioneered the introduction of Shan-
non's ideas into the sciences, in effect took Wiener's stance, renam-
ing Shannon's entropy formulation as 'negentropy' (Brillouin 1962). 
As we shall see later, Tom Stonier took the same approach, propos-
ing a framework for a unified understanding of information in vari-
ous domains.   
  
Marcia Bates (2005) noted that the idea of 'information as pattern / 
organisation' was  ‘endemic’ during the 1970s, and identified Parker 
(1974, 10) as the first to state explicitly in a library/information con-
text that "information is the pattern or organization of matter and en-
ergy". While this concept has gained some popularity, it is by no 
means universally accepted: Birger Hjørland (2008) speaks for those 
who doubt it, saying that such patterns are nothing more than pat-
terns until they inform somebody about something. Reading (2011) 
exemplifies those who take a middle course, positing that such pat-
terns are information, but 'meaningless information', in contrast to 
the 'meaningful information' encountered in social, and, arguably, in 
biological, systems. 
  
We now consider how these ideas were applied to bring information 
as an entity into the physical sciences. 
 
2.2 Information physics 
The idea of information as a feature of the physical world arose 
through studies of the thermodynamic property known as entropy. 
Usually understood as a measure of the disorder of a physical sys-
tem, entropy has also come to be associated with the extent of our 
knowledge of it; the more disordered a system, the less detailed 
knowledge we have of where its components are, or what they are 
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doing. This idea was formalised by Zurek (1989), though it builds on 
earlier insights of scientists such as Ludwig Boltzmann and Leo 
Szilard who introduced information as a fundamental concept in sci-
ence, though it was not named by them as such.  
 
Boltzmann related the entropy of gases to their degree of disorder, 
measured in probability terms, showing that entropy was related to 
the probability of collisions between gas particles with different ve-
locities. Hence it could be equated to the probability distribution of 
the states of a system, expressed by the formula 
S = k log W 
where k is Boltzmann's constant, and W is a measure of the number 
of states of a system; i.e. the ways that molecules can be arranged, 
given a known total energy. This equation is certainly reminiscent of 
later information theory formalisms, but – although it is carved on 
his tombstone in the Vienna cemetery (actually using an Ω symbol 
instead of the more modern W) – Boltzmann never wrote it in this 
form, which is due to Max Planck (Atkins 2007). To suggest, as 
does von Baeyer (2003, 98), that "by identifying entropy with miss-
ing information, Boltzmann hurled the concept of information into 
the realm of physics" seems to be anachronistic, as well as over-
dramatic. 
  
Szilard (1929) analysed the well-worked thermodynamic problem of 
'Maxwell's Demon' (Leff & Rex 1990, 2002), in what was subse-
quently assessed as "the earliest known paper in the field of infor-
mation theory" (Hargatti 2006, 46), though information is again not 
specifically mentioned. As Szilard himself later recalled:  
 
… I wrote a little paper which was on a rather closely related subject [to a paper on the 
second law of thermodynamics]. It dealt with the problem of what is essential in the 
operations of the so-called Maxwell's Demon, who guesses right and then does 
something, and by guessing right and doing something he can violate the second law of 
thermodynamics. This paper was a radical departure in thinking, because I said that the 
essential thing here is that the demon utilizes information – to be precise, information 
which is not really in his possession until he guesses it. I said that there is a relationship 
between information and entropy, and I computed what that relationship was. No one paid 
any attention to this paper until, after the war, information theory became fashionable. 
Then the paper was rediscovered. Now this old paper, to which for over 35 years nobody 




True information physics began decades later when the ideas of in-
formation theory were introduced into science, by pioneers such as 
Leon Brillouin (1962). In essence, this amounted to recognising a 
formal mathematical link between entropy and information, when 
information is defined in the way required by Shannon's theory (alt-
hough it should be noted that it was Wiener's interpretation that was 
generally adopted) or, indeed, by other formalisms for defining in-
formation in objective and quantitative terms, such as Fisher infor-
mation (Frieden 1999), a quantitative measure of information used 
most often in statistical analysis.   
 
Subsequent analysis of the relation between information and physi-
cal entropy led Landauer (1991) to propose his well-known apho-
rism 'information is physical'. Information must always be instanti-
ated in some physical system; that is to say, in some kind of 
document, in the broadest sense. Information is subject to physical 
laws, and these laws can, in turn, be cast in information terms. The 
physical nature of information, and, in particular, its relation to en-
tropy, continues to arouse debate; for early discussions, see Av-
ramescu (1980) and Shaw and Davis (1983), and for recent contribu-
tions, see Duncan and Semura (2007) and Karnani, Pääkkönen, and 
Annila (2009). 
 
The idea of information as a fundamental physical entity has re-
ceived increasing attention in recent decades, inspired particularly 
by an association of information with complexity; see Zurek (1990) 
for papers from a seminal meeting which effectively launched this 
approach. Information has been proposed as a fundamental aspect of 
the physical universe, on a par with – or even more fundamental 
than – matter and energy. The American physicist John Wheeler is 
generally recognised as the originator of this approach, stemming 
from his focus on the foundations of physics, leading him to formu-
late what he termed his ‘Really Big Questions’, such as ‘How come 
existence?’ and ‘Why the quantum?’. Two of his questions involved 
information and meaning. In asking ‘It from bit?’, Wheeler queried 
whether information was a concept playing a significant role at the 
foundations of physics; whether it was a fundamental physical enti-
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ty, equivalent to, say, energy. Indeed, he divided his own intellectual 
career into three phases: from a starting belief that 'Everything is 
particles', he moved through a view that 'Everything is fields', to fi-
nally conclude that 'Everything is information', focusing on the idea 
that logic and information form the bedrock of physical theory 
(MacPherson 2008). In asking ‘What makes meaning?’, he invoked 
the idea of a ‘participatory universe’, in which conscious beings may 
play an active role in determining the nature of the physical uni-
verse. Wheeler's views are surveyed, critiqued, and extended in pa-
pers in Barrow, Davies and Harper (2004). 
 
 Other well-known contributors to the information physics approach 
are: Lee Smolin (2000), who has suggested that the idea of space it-
self may be replaceable by a 'network of relations' or a  'web of in-
formation'; Seth Lloyd (2006, 2010), who argues that 'the universe 
computes' (specifically in the form of a quantum computer); and 
David Deutsch, who proposes that information flow determines the 
nature of everything that is. "The physical world is a multiverse", 
writes Deutsch (2011, 304), "and its structure is determined by how 
information flows in it. In many regions of the multiverse, infor-
mation flows in quasi-autonomous streams called histories, one of 
which we call our universe". 'Information flow', in this account, may 
be (simplistically) regarded as what changes occur in what order. Fi-
nally, having mentioned the multiverse, we should note that the in-
creasingly influential 'many worlds' interpretation of quantum me-
chanics is inextricably linked with information concepts  (Byrne 
2010; Saunders, Barrett, Kent and Wallace 2010; Wallace 2012). 
 
'Information', in the physical realm is invariably defined in an objec-
tive, meaning-free way. However, there has been a realisation that 
information content, as assessed by any of the formalisms, with ran-
domness giving the highest information content by Shannon's meas-
ure, is not an intuitively sensible measure. Interest has focused on 
ideas of complexity, and on the idea that it is from an interaction of 
order and randomness that complex systems, embodying 'interesting' 
information, emerge. This has led to alternative measures of com-
plexity and order (Lloyd 2001, 2006, Gell-Mann and Lloyd 1998). 
Examples, with very informal explanations are: algorithmic infor-
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mation content (related to the length of the shortest algorithm which 
recreates the state; ordered systems need only short algorithms); log-
ical depth (related to the running time of the simplest algorithm 
which recreates the state); and thermodynamic depth (related to the 
number of possible ways that a system may arrive at its present 
state; ‘deep’ systems are hard to create). These offer the promise of 
quantifying physical information in ways which, by contrast with the 
Shannon formalism, account for emergent properties, and to ‘inter-
esting’ informational structures, of potential relevance to biological 
and social domains, as well as providing powerful tools for explain-
ing the physical world; for popular accounts see Gell-Mann (1995) 
and Barrow (2007). 
 
At about the same time, in the 1940s, as the groundwork for an in-
formation perspective on the physical sciences was being developed, 
the same was happening in biology, and it is to that domain we now 
turn. 
 
2.3 Information biology 
In biology, the discovery of the genetic code and the statement of the 
so-called 'central dogma' of molecular biology – that information 
flows from DNA to proteins –  have led to the ideas that information 
is a fundamental biological property, and that the ability to process 
information may be a characteristic of living things as fundamental 
as, or more fundamental than, metabolism, reproduction, and other 
signifiers of life. Dartnell (2007) describes this as the Darwinian def-
inition: life as information transmission. For this reason, it is some-
times stated that biology is now an information science; see, for ex-
ample, Baltimore (2002), Maynard Smith (2010), and Terzis and 
Arp (2011).  
 
Concepts of information in the biology domain are varied, and we 
make no attempt to summarise a complex area. Information may 
manifest in many contexts: the transmission of genetic information 
through the DNA code, the transmission of neural information, and 
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the many and varied forms of communication and signalling be-
tween living things being just three examples. One vexed, and unde-
cided, question is at what stage ‘meaning’ can be said to appear; 
some authors argue that it is sensible to speak of the meaning of a 
segment of DNA, while others allege that meaning is an accompa-
niment of consciousness. And there are those who suggest that con-
sciousness itself is explicable in information terms; see, for instance, 
Tonioni’s (2008) ideas of consciousness as integrated information.    
 
The analysis of living systems in information terms has been typical-
ly associated with a reductionist approach, with enthusiastic adop-
tion of Shannon's 'meaning-free' formulae to assess the information 
content of living things; see, for example Gatlin (1972). An idea 
similar to Wiener's conception of information as an opposite of en-
tropy had been proposed at an early stage by the German physicist 
Erwin Schrödinger (1944), one of the pioneers of quantum mechan-
ics, who had suggested that living organisms fed upon such negative 
entropy. Later, the idea of information as the opposite of entropy 
was popularised, under the name of 'negentropy', by Brillouin 
(1962), and was adopted by researchers in several areas of biology, 
including ecology; for examples, see Patten (1961), Kier (1980), and 
Jaffe (1984). 
 
However, such approaches, with their generally reductionist over-
tones, have not been particularly fruitful, leading some biologists to 
favour an approach focusing more on the emergence of complexity 
and, in various senses, meaning; see, for example, Hazen, Griffin, 
Carothers and Szostak (2007). Several authors have considered the 
ways in which information may both influence and be influenced by 
evolutionary processes relating this to the evolution of exosomatic 
meaningful information in the human realm; see, for example, 
Goonatilake (1994), Madden (2004), Auletta (2011), and Reading 
(2011). 
 
Meaningful information, though not yet accepted as a central con-
cept in biology, is certainly so in the realm of human, social, com-
municable information, to which we now turn. 
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2.4 Social information 
The social, or human, conception of information is, of course, prom-
inent in library/information science. As such, it is likely to be most 
familiar to this book’s readers, and, accordingly, this section is rela-
tively short. But information is also a significant concept in other 
human-centred disciplines, including psychology, semiotics, com-
munication studies, and sociology. While the exact conceptions, and 
to a degree the terminology differ, all take a subjective and context-
dependent view of information; one which is associated with 
knowledge and meaning. Information is regarded as something 
which is always and inevitably associated with human beings being 
informed about, and therefore knowing, something, and that infor-
mation having a meaning to them. There are, of course, a variety of 
ways in which human-centred information may be conceptualised; 
some of these are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
There have been attempts to bridge the gap between this conception 
of information and the scientific and technical perspective. A variety 
of means have been adopted to try to extend the kind of information 
theory pioneered by Shannon and by Wiener to deal with meaning-
ful semantic information, and to develop mathematical models for 
information flow: see Dretske (1981) and Barwise and Seligman 
(1997) as examples, and see Cornelius (2002) and Floridi (2011a) 
for reviews. Some authors, such as Qvortrup (1993), have argued 
that the information theory formalisms in themselves are not as ob-
jective, external, and impersonal as suggested, but this view has not 
been generally accepted. 
 
The 'negentropy' concept has been applied, some would argue un-
wisely, to such areas as economics, sociology, psychology and the-
ology. Müller (2007, 73), a scientist in the field of chemical thermo-
dynamics, warns against "a lack of intellectual thoroughness in such 
extrapolations. Each one ought to be examined properly for mere 
shallow analogies". The same is surely true for applications in the li-
brary/information sciences.  
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Finally, in this brief survey of information concepts in different do-
mains, we consider philosophy. Although the sub-discipline of epis-
temology has studied the nature of knowledge for many centuries, 
information per se has not until recently been of major concern to 
philosophers.  
2.5 Philosophy of information 
Before Luciano Floridi proposed his 'philosophy of information' in 
the late 1990s (as he recounts in Floridi 2010b), relatively few phi-
losophers took any interest in information, at least in a way likely to 
be of value for library/information science; see Furner (2010) for an 
insightful overview. Knowledge, of course, is another matter; that 
has been studied for many centuries, as the subject matter of episte-
mology. The usual view in that context is that knowledge is to be 
understood as 'justified, true belief'; that is to say, for something to 
count as knowledge, it must be believed by someone, for rational 
reasons, and it must be true. Information fits into epistemology in 
the form of testimony. This is a kind of evidence in which philoso-
phers are becoming increasingly interested; see, for example, Audi 
(1997) and Adler (2010). 
 
Apart from this, there have been a number of developments in philo-
sophical thought which provide ways of viewing the relations be-
tween information and knowledge which offer different insights to 
the Popperian Three Worlds 'objective knowledge' model and the 
data-information-knowledge hierarchy, both of which have already 
been mentioned. One is the work of philosophers such as Dretske 
(1981), who have attempted to extend Shannon theory into the area 
of semantic information. Another, and certainly the most ambitious 
to date, is that within Floridi's ‘philosophy of information’, which 
will be discussed in detail later. We may also mention three other in-
teresting ideas: David Deutsch's (2011) concept of 'explanatory 
knowledge', which comprises our best rational explanations for the 
way the world is, with the understanding that such knowledge is in-
evitably fallible and imperfect, and our task is to improve it, not to 
justify it; Jonathan Kvanvig's (2003) idea of knowledge as 'under-
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standing', which allows for contradictions and inconsistencies; and 
Michael Polanyi's (1962) ideas of 'personal knowledge' (somewhat 
similar to Popper's World 2), which have been further developed 
within the context of library/information science; see, for example, 
Day (2005). 
 
This concludes our cursory examination of information in different 




3 Identifying the gaps 
We have noted the various ways in which the information concept 
can be used in five domains, and some of the attempts made to trans-
fer concepts and formalisms between domains. We could add others, 
not least library/information science, but five is more than sufficient.  
 
In principle, we could seek to describe the gap between the infor-
mation concept between each pair of domains, but a simpler and 
more sensible alternative is to hand. Consideration of the ways in 
which information is understood in the various domains leads us to 
two alternatives, both of which have been espoused in the literature.  
 
The first is to consider a binary divide, between those domains in 
which information is treated as something objective, quantitative, 
and mainly associated with data, and those in which it is treated as 
subjective, qualitative, and mainly associated with knowledge, 
meaning, and understanding. The former include physics and tech-
nology; the latter include the social realm. The biological treatment 
of information is ambiguous, lying somewhere between the two, 
though tending to the former the more information-centred the bio-
logical approach is, especially in the more reductive areas of genet-
ics, genomics, and bioinformatics. The philosophical treatment de-
pends on the philosopher; as we have seen, different philosophers 
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and schools of philosophy take radically different views of the con-
cept of information.  
 
The second alternative is slightly more complex, and envisages a 
three-way demarcation, with the biological treatment of information 
occupying a distinct position between the other two extremes, physi-
cal and social. 
  
Whichever of these alternatives is preferred, the basic question is the 
same: to what extent, if at all, are objective, quantitative, and 'mean-
ing-free' notions of information 'the same as', emergent into, or at 
least in some way related to, subjective, qualitative, and 'meaningful' 
notions. This, we suggest, is in essence the same question as 
Wheeler framed when he asked 'What makes meaning?'. 
 
 
4 Bridging the gaps  
There have been a number of contributions to the literature suggest-
ing, in general terms, that 'gap bridging' may be feasible and desira-
ble, without giving any very definite suggestions as to how this may 
be done. One of the authors of this chapter has put forward a pro-
posal of this vague nature, suggesting that information in human, bi-
ological, and physical realms is related through emergent properties 
in complex systems (Bawden 2007a, 2007b). In this view, physical 
information is associated with pattern, biological information with 
meaning, and social information with understanding.   
 
In an influential paper from 1991, Buckland distinguished three uses 
of the term  'information':  
• Information-as-thing, where the information is associated with a 
document; 
• Information-as-process, where the information is that which 
changes a person's knowledge state; 
• Information-as-knowledge, where the information is equated 
with the knowledge which it imparts. 
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From the information-as-thing viewpoint, information is regarded as 
physical and objective, or at least as being 'contained within' physi-
cal documents and essentially equivalent to them. The other two 
meanings treat information as abstract and intangible. Buckland 
gives arguments in favour of the information-as-thing approach, as 
being very directly relevant to information science, since it deals 
primarily with information in the form of documents. Information-
as-process underlies theories of information behaviour which have a 
focus on the experience of individuals, such as those of Dervin and 
Kuhlthau (Bawden and Robinson 2012). Information-as-knowledge 
invokes the idea, well-trodden in the library/information area, as 
noted above, that information and knowledge are closely related. 
The exact relation, however, is not an obvious one. How is 
knowledge to be understood here? As a ‘refined’, summarised, and 
evaluated form of information?; as a structured and contextualised 
form of information?; or information embedded within an individu-
al’s knowledge structure? These, and other, ideas all have their sup-
porters. 
 
We will now look at three approaches to this kind of gap bridging 
which offer more concrete proposals: those of Tom Stonier, Marcia 
Bates, and Luciano Floridi. 
 
Stonier, in a series of three books, advanced a model of information 
as an abstract force promoting organisation in systems of all kinds: 
physical, biological, mental, and social, including recorded infor-
mation (Stonier 1990, 1992, 1997). This is a model envisaging the 
bridging of two distinct gaps, in the terms discussed above. Stonier 
regards information, in its most fundamental form, as a physical en-
tity analogous to energy; whereas energy, in his view, is defined as 
the capacity to perform work, information is the capacity to organise 
a system, or to maintain it in a state of organisation. He regards a 
high-information state as one that is organised and of low physical 
entropy. This, he points out is the opposite of Shannon’s relation be-
tween information and entropy, which Stonier regards as an unfortu-
nate metaphor. He links this concept of information to biological and 
human information, or as he prefers intelligence, and to meaning, 
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through an evolutionary process. Salthe (2011) presents a somewhat 
similar viewpoint linking thermodynamic entropy and Shannon in-
formation through to meaning and semiotics. 
  
Bates, has advanced a similar all-encompassing model, which she 
characterises as 'evolutionary' (Bates 2005, 2006). It relies on identi-
fying and interrelating a number of 'information-like' entities:  
• Information 1 – the pattern of organization of matter and en-
ergy 
• Information 2 – some pattern of organization of matter and 
energy given meaning by a living being 
• Data 1 – that portion of the entire information environment 
available to a sensing organism that is taken in, or processed, 
by that organism 
• Data 2 – information selected or generated by human beings 
for social purposes 
• Knowledge – information given meaning and integrated with 
other contents of understanding 
This model, while all-encompassing and one of the more ambitious 
attempts at integrating information in all its contexts, remains at a 
conceptual and qualitative level, and introduces a potentially confus-
ing multiplicity of forms of information and similar entities. In par-
ticular, the distinction between Information 1 and Information 2, 
without any clear indication of their relation, seems to perpetuate a 
gap, rather than bridge one.  Bates describes her approach as evolu-
tionary, and relates it to the approaches of Goonatilake (1991) and 
Madden (2004), mentioned earlier, though these latter start with in-
formation in the biological realm, rather than the, arguably more 
basic, physical world. She argues that the different forms of infor-
mation are emergent, as animals – not just humans – can recognise 
patterns of physical information in their environment. Animals can 
assign meaning to such recognition, though not in a conscious act of 
labelling; this is reserved for the human realm. In contrast to Stonier, 
she argues that information is the order in the system, rather than its 
capacity to create order (both of which, we may remind ourselves, 
are the opposite of the Shannon conception). For Bates, knowing the 
degree of order of a system tells us how much information it con-
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tains; for Stonier, knowing how much information is in it tells us 
how it may be ordered. 
  
Floridi (2010a, 2011b) has presented a General Definition of Infor-
mation (GDI) as part of his Philosophy of Information, analysing the 
ways in which information may be understood, and opting to regard 
it from the semantic viewpoint, as "well-formed, meaningful and 
truthful data". Data is understood here as simply a lack of uniformi-
ty; a noticeable difference or distinction in something. To count as 
information, individual data elements must be compiled into a col-
lection which must be well-formed (put together correctly according 
to relevant syntax), meaningful (complying with relevant semantics), 
and truthful; the latter requires a detailed analysis of the nature of 
true information, as distinct from misinformation, pseudo-
information and false information. Although Floridi takes account of 
Shannon’s formalism in the development of his conception of in-
formation, and argues that it “provides the necessary ground to un-
derstand other kinds of information” (Floridi 2010a, 78), he moves 
beyond it in discussing human, semantic information. His analysis 
also includes biological information in detail; noting that it is com-
plex and multifaceted, he treats, for example, genetic and neural in-
formation separately. Meaningful information and knowledge are 
part of the same conceptual family. Information is converted to 
knowledge by being inter-related, a process that may be expressed 
through network theory. Informally, "what [knowledge] enjoys and 
[information] lacks … is the web of mutual relations that allow one 
part of it to account for another. Shatter that, and you are left with a 
pile of truths or a random list of bits of information that cannot help 
to make sense of the reality that they seek to address" (Floridi 
2011b, 288). Furthermore, information that is meaningful must also 
be relevant in order to qualify as knowledge, and this aspect may be 
formally modelled, as also the distinction between 'knowing', 'be-
lieving', and 'being informed'. 
 
This is therefore a formalism – the only one of its kind thus far – 
which begins with a treatment of information in Shannon's objective 
sense, and goes on, apparently seamlessly, to include subjectivity, 
meaning, and relevance. It provides a formal framework for under-
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standing a variety of forms of information, and, while in itself an ex-
ercise in philosophical analysis, it may serve as a basis for other 
forms of consideration of information in various domains. It also, 
happily, includes and systematises library/information science's 
pragmatic approaches to the information-knowledge relation, dis-
cussed earlier. 
  
While undoubtedly valuable as a framework for understanding, Flo-
ridi's conceptualisation does not of itself answer our basic question: 
which, if any, conceptions, and laws and principles, of information 
in one domain can be meaningfully applied in another? We will go 
on to consider this, but first we must ask: why bother? 
  
   
5 Why attempt to bridge the gaps? 
The question then inevitably arises as to whether these various ideas 
of information have any relevance for the library/information sci-
ences, whether it just happens that the English word 'information' is 
used to mean quite different things in different contexts, or whether 
any connections which there may be are so vague and limited as to 
be of little interest or value. 
 
We believe that this is a question well worth investigating, and not 
just for the sake of having a neat and all-encompassing framework. 
If the gaps between different understandings of information can be 
bridged in some way, then there is a possibility for helpful interac-
tions and synergies between the different conceptualisations. In par-
ticular, if it is correct that the principles of physics and of biology 
can be, to a significant extent, cast in information terms, then there 
should be the possibility, at the least, for analogies helpful to human-
centred disciplines, including library/information science to be iden-
tified. This need not be in any sense a reductionist enterprise, at-
tempting to 'explain away' social and human factors in physical and 
biological terms. Nor need it be just one way. If it is true, as some 
authors suggest, that there are some general principles, involving in-
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formation, complexity, meaning, and similar entities and concepts, 
which operate very widely, beyond the scope of individual disci-
plines, then it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that insights 
from the library/information sciences could 'feed back' to inform 
physical and biological conceptions. No such examples have yet 
been reported, though one might envisages them coming from areas 
such as infometrics, information behaviour, and information organi-
sation. This kind of feedback is, of course, in the opposite direction 
to the common reductive approach, by which physics informs chem-
istry, which informs biology, which in turn informs the social sci-
ences. If it ever proved fruitful, it would have the potential to change 
the standing of the library/information sciences within the academic 
spectrum, giving it a place as a more fundamental discipline.  
   
Let us, at the risk of seriously annoying those readers who will think 
this approach too naïve to be worth dignifying in print, give some 
examples of physical laws which could have 'information analogies'; 
for a popular account of these laws, see Pickover (2008).  
 
To begin with perhaps the simplest possible example, Ohm's law 
states that the strength of an electric current, I, is proportional to the 
applied voltage, V, and inversely proportional to the resistance, R, of 
the material carrying the current; in appropriate units,  I = V / R. We 
can easily envisage an information analogy, with information flow 
equating to current, the strength of the need for information equating 
to voltage, and a measure of difficulty of obtaining the necessary in-
formation equating to resistance. So, if we consider the situation of a 
doctor treating a seriously ill patient, and needing to know the ap-
propriate drug treatment, we have a high value of V. If the doctor 
has in their pocket a mobile device giving immediate access to well-
structure drug information, then we might say that R was low. 
 
Too simple? How about Poiseille's Law, which governs the rate of 
flow, Q, of a fluid with viscosity µ through a pipe of length L and 
internal radius r, when there is a pressure difference ∆P. The formu-
la, assuming that the flow is smooth, without any turbulence, and 
that the density of the fluid never changes, is Q = πr4∆P / 8µL. 
Again, we may amuse ourselves looking for information equiva-
23 
lents: the length of the pipe equates to the number of steps in a 
communication chain; its internal radius equates the amount of in-
formation which can be transferred; the viscosity equates to the dif-
ficulty in understanding the information; and so on.  This is not such 
an odd idea: Qvortrup (1993) reminds us that Shannon's theories are 
firmly based on the metaphor of information as water flowing 
through a pipe. 
 
Another example is the use of the various scientific diffusion laws, 
which offer clear analogies with information dissemination. Av-
ramescu (1980) gave an early example of this, using laws for the dif-
fusion of heat in solids, equating temperature to the extent of interest 
in the information; Liu and Rousseau (2012) review this and other 
examples. Le Coadic (1987) mentions this, and similar attempts to 
use diffusion and transfer models drawn for both the physical and 
biological sciences, while cautioning against the uncritical use of 
such analogies. However, provided they are treated with due cau-
tion, such analogies with physical laws, even if it be accepted that 
there is no underlying common ‘meta-law’, may be of value as aids 
to teaching and learning, and to the early stages of the planning of 
research.  
 
We must also mention quantum mechanics, the most fundamental 
scientific advance of the last century, of which both the mathemati-
cal formalism (directly) and concepts (by analogy) have been ap-
plied in a library/information science context; see, for example, 
Piwowarski, Amini and Lalmas (2012), Piwowarski, Frommholz, 
Lalmas and van Rijsbergen (2010), and Budd (2012). 
 
It may be objected that this is too simplistic an approach. Physical 
laws are physical laws, and are too specific to their context to be 
adapted for human information, and do not take account of its dy-
namic nature, nor of the ability of humans to be more than passive 
recipients.  
 
What, then, about a more general principle? In the physical sciences, 
the principle of least action occupies a central place, as does Zipf's 
principle of least effort in the social, including library/information, 
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sciences. Is it unreasonable to ask if there may be a reason for this, 
which would involve some common aspects of information in the 
two realms? 
 
Or perhaps we should look rather at statistical regularities, whether 
these be called laws or not, and consider whether there may be some 
underlying reasons, if similar regularities are found in different 
realms. One example may be the fractal, or self-similar, nature of 
many physical systems, which, it is hypothesised, may also be found 
in technical and social information; see, for example, Ottaviani 
(1994) and Berners-Lee and Kagal (2008). Similarly the power law 
relationships underlying the main bibliometric laws (Egghe 2005) 
have their equivalents in power laws in the physical and biological 
sciences. 
  
The important question is not which of these ideas or approaches is 
'right'. It is simply whether it is rational and appropriate to look at 
ideas of information in different domains, seeking for causal links, 
emergent properties, analogies, or perhaps just helpful metaphors. It 
is by no means certain that this is so. We have seen that some scien-
tists, such as Müller, object to the use of information concepts in 
thermodynamics. And, conversely, many in the library/information 
sciences are concerned about the application of the term 'infor-
mation' to objective, meaningless patterns. Le Coadic (1987), Cole 
(1994), Hjørland (2007, 2008), and Ma (2012), for example, argue in 
various ways against any equating of the idea of information as an 
objective and measurable 'thing' to the kind of information of inter-
est in library and information science; this kind of information, such 
commentators argue, is subjective in nature, having meaning for a 
person in a particular context, and cannot be reduced to a single ob-
jective, still less quantifiable, definition. However, this perhaps 
overlooks some recent trends in the physical and biological sciences 
themselves: not merely the increased focus on information noted 
above, but a tendency towards conceptualisations involving non-
linearity, systems thinking, complexity, and reflexivity. All these 
tend to make current scientific thinking a more amenable source of 
analogy for the library/information sciences, than heretofore.  
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It may also be objected that the physical, and to a degree the biolog-
ical, sciences are necessarily mathematical in nature, whereas the li-
brary/information sciences are largely qualitative. While qualitative 
analysis is certainly necessary, and indeed arguably the best way of 
achieving understanding in this field (Bawden 2012), this is no rea-
son not to seek for mathematical formalisms to increase and deepen 
such understanding. Over thirty years ago, Brookes (1980) argued 
that information science needed a different kind of mathematics; 
perhaps the library/information sciences still do. 
 
Our view is that the questions are so intriguing that it is worth the at-
tempt to bridge these gaps. And we believe that the valuable insights 
already gained from the kinds of approaches discussed above justi-
fies this position. Wheeler's Big Questions have not been answered 
yet, and it may be that studies of the relation between information as 
understood in the library/information sciences, and as understood in 




We are faced with two kinds of gaps: the gaps between the concepts 
of information in different domains; and the gap between those who 
believe that it is worth trying to bridge such gaps and those who be-
lieve that such attempts are, for the most part at least, doomed to 
fail. 
  
The authors of this chapter consider themselves in the first group. 
But we wish to be realistic about what can be attempted: as Jonathan 
Furner (2010, 174) puts it, "the outlook for those who would hold 
out for a 'one size fits all' transdisciplinary definition of information 
is not promising". We should not look for, nor expect to find, direct 
and simplistic equivalences; rather we can hope to uncover more 
subtle linkages, perhaps to be found through the use of concepts 
such as complexity and emergence. 
 
26  
We would also do well to note Bates' (2005) reminder that there are 
swings of fashion in this area, as in many other academic areas. The 
recent favouring of subjective and qualitative conceptions of infor-
mation is perhaps a reaction to the strong objectivity of information 
science in preceding decades, which was itself a reaction to the per-
ceived limitations of traditional subjectivist methods of li-
brary/information science (Bates 2005). Perhaps the time has come 
for something of a swing back, to allow a merging of views, and a 
place for different viewpoints in a holistic framework. A bridging of 
gaps, in fact. A number of authors have advocated this, though so far 
it has not happened. 
 
At a time when other disciplines, particularly in the physical and bi-
ological sciences, are embracing information as a vital concept, it 
seems unwise for the library/information sciences to ignore poten-
tially valuable insights, though we certainly wish to avoid the shal-
low analogies mentioned above. 
 
Mind the gaps, certainly, but be aware of the insights that may be 
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